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J\:either virtue nor the \'irtues seem to be in the forE'front of r1'cent moral or 
ethical thinking. I have never heard anyone seriously ask whether some man or other 
was virtuous. The very suggestion that he is, is faintly ridiculous. perhaps insulting. 
The virtuous Isidore in Maupassant's novella of that title, is a village idiot. And since 
the sexual revolution. interest in and concern about the virtue of women also seems 
to have declined enormously. Even feeling virtuous, which some people do and talk 
about, is usuaJly confined to relatively trivial matters, such as writing a lettE'r to an 
old aunt, chopping the firewood or refusing a second helping of de�erl. To say that 
one felt virtuous when, at the cost of a leg, one had rescued a person battling with 
a shark, would surely be to misdescribe what one felt. Thus, it  is not so much that 
virtue has changed its denotation--as it did in Victorian England whE'n it came to 
mean only one of the virtues, chastity--but rather that the term is now hardly used 
at all; that if someone did use it, one would think him quaint or suspect him of be­
ing facetious or one would remain in doubt about exactly what he meant to say. 
This seems to me a serious threat to morality and with it the good life for a]J. 
I would guess that one of the causes of this development is the spread of the belief-· 
sound enough as far as it goes-·that the decisive fact!.or in determill'ing the good life 
for the individuaJ is the design of the social order and especially its economic sec­
tor. It is natural but nevertheEess mistaken to infer from this that if we but reform 
the sociaJ order, we can forget about individual virtues and vices. 
There has been a similar shift in ethical theory . In the words ·of Georg Henrik 
von Wright, 
"Virtue is a neglected topic in modern ethics. The only 
full-scaJe modern treatment of it. known to me, is by 
Nicolai Hartmann. When one compares the place accord· 
ed to virtue in modern philosophy with that accorded to 
it in traditional moral philosophy, one may get the im­
pression that virtue as a topic of �hilosophic discussion 
has become obsolete, outmoded." 
Under the influence of von Wright and others2 there has been a revival of interest 
in the topic. However, this revivaJ has taken two forms, a moderate and a radical 
one. The moderate form, espoused by von Wright, Frankena, and others, points to 
the peculiarities of the concept of virtue and the vi.rtues and stresses their import­
ance in a complete account of ethics without, however, rejecting the modern insis­
tence on the primacy of the axiological and deontological notions in ethical theory. 
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Thus Frankena says, 
"[ propose therefore that we regard the moral ily of 
principles and the morality of character. or doing and 
being, not as rivaJ kinds or morality between which we 
must choose, but as two complement.ary aspects of the 
same moraJity. Then, for every principle there will be a 
morally good trail, oft.en going by the same name, con­
sisting or a disposition or tendency to act according to 
it; and for every moraJly good trait there will be a prin· 
ciple defining the kind of action in which it is to express 
itself . ... Even if we adopt this double-aspect conception 
of morality, in which principles are basic, we may still 
agree that morality does and must put a premium on 
being honest, conscientious and so forth. If its sanctions 
or sources are not to be external, .. .if it is to have ade­
quate 'internal sanctions,' as Mill called the-m, then mor­
aJity must foster the development of such dispositions 
and habits as have been mentioned. ,,3 
By contrast the radical version conceives of virtues, not as dispositions or ha­
bits to behave in certain ways specifiable in advance but rather as character traits 
possessed by a person to the extent that he approximates the type of character 
which the trait represents. 
68 
Thus M. F. Burnyeat says, 
" ... the best way of dealing with virtues and vices and 
other character traits seems to be by analogy with the 
character of individuals. One may list a number of things 
as characteristic of a person but the conjunctive unity of 
a list is not enough to represent his individuality or to 
make 'acting out of character' as surprising as is compat­
ible with being possible; for that the items listed must 
be seen as having a certain coherence, as fitting together 
to make up the 'essence' of a person. Similarly, listing 
actions, motives, emotions, and so on is inadequate to 
define a trait of character: They must be thought of as 
characteristic of a type of person before they will cohere 
into a whole. Then we can say that a man possesses the 
trait to the extent that he approximates the type it 
represents. 
This gives a sense in which 'the notion of a brave, 
generous, temperate, etc., act is secondary to the notion 
of a brave, generous, temperate, etc., man.' (This is a 
reference to von Wright's The Varieties of Goodness, 
p. 142.) Isolated acts of courage or generosity are not 
excluded, but it may be hard to pick them out without 
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furl.her consideration of the agent's character in the light 
of other aclions and even other virtues. Correspondingly. 
a morality centered on being rather than doing will not 
presume to map out a path of the good life in individual­
prescribed steps. ,.4 
It should be noted that the main contention of the radical ,·iiew that virtues 
"belong to" being rather than to doing does not requiN> the radical conclusion that 
the ethics of being is prior to or independent of the ethics of doing. On the con­
trary, von Wright argues, in my view persuasively.  that 
hence 
Yet 
"The right choice in a situation, wl.en a virtue is involved, 
need not be the choice of a so-called virtuous act (Thus 
a man of courage may sometimes rightly choose to re· 
treat from danger, but that is never a•1 act of courage)" 
"a virtue is an 'inward' trait of character rather than an 
'outward' feature of conduct."5 
"virtues are no ends in themselves but instruments in the 
service of the good of man and .. .it is only by being 
aware of harmful consequences of yielding to passion 
that man has a rational ground for aspiring after vir­
tues. "6 
It is perhaps worth adding that they would not be virtues if there were no 
good reason for aspiring after them. 
It seems to me that whereas the moderate form of the revival of the ethics of 
virtue is eminently sound and may even help to reinvigorate moral education, the 
radical view understandably popular among Ancient philosophers, is mistaken. I 
want to sketch what such a ra,dical Virtue Ethics, one in which "being has priority 
over doing," was like, and how and why it was gradually and rightly superseded by 
an ethics of doing. 
My first sketch is of the morality of the Homeric Greeks. There, the central 
question was no,t, as it is today, 'What ought one to do?' but, 'What is a good man? 
An agathos?'. And the answer to this question, formuJated in the most general way. 
was: a good man is a man with a certain set of qualities, excellences, or aretai, the 
Greek term usually translated as virtues. 
This is simply a special case of the general answer the Greeks later give to all 
questions of the form, 'What is it for something to be a good thing of its kind?• 
namely, to have ithe relevant set of qualities, excellences or "virtues". Ships, shields, 
horses, athletes, soldiers, and physicians are good or bad ships, soldiers, horses, etc . •  
depending on the extent to which they do what is expected of them in their partic-
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ular role or function. It is, a corolla') of such things being good ont·'> of th1•1r k111d. 
that it is then appropriate for JX>Ople to adopt the ap ropriate fan>rablt- attiludf: 
towards them, and when they are bad ones the appropriate unfa,orable one. Th1-
Greeks were not completely clear about what were appropriate attitucies in di ffl·r· 
ent cases. They did not say, for instance. whether the apprr>priate attitude toward:) 
a good horse is the same as that towards a good man. And if not . what is the di ffer· 
ence and why. 
In any case , the Creeks thought that the sort of thing that makes someoiw a 
good X, say, a good doctor, captain, soldier, and so on, namely. the excellences relP­
vant to the role also mak� him a good man, that is, a good one not as a certain sort 
of role player but simply as a man. The Homeric Greeks do not sel-m to haH• dis­
tinguished these two questions at all clearly. Perhaps if they had. they would not 
have been satisfied with their own answer, namely, that the excellences of a man as 
!...!!!!.!! are the same as the excellences of a man in his role as a membrr of the ruling 
warrior class. SJ)('aking very roughly, the social order of the Homeric Greeks crn­
ters not on a state, not even a city state, but on the oikos, the household. Attention 
is paid mostly to what goes on inside the household and only minimally to the rela­
tions between different households, as when they exchange gifts, look for wives, 
or form all iances to make war. This social order divides the members of a house­
hold into two major classes, the well-born (that is, the lord of the household and 
his family),, and the others, his retainers and slaves. The primary Lask of the well­
bom men is to protect the members of the household against its enemies, and per· 
haps the oc,casional organization of a war on its neighbors. The role of the not-well· 
bom is ttie performance of productive tasks and services to the well-born. Members 
of this lower class are expected to admire, honor. defer to, serve., and obey the wel:­
born, especially those wh'b have the excellences associated with their class role. 
Note. however, that the agothos, the excellent or virtuous man, was judged 
so on the basis of what we would now regard as two radically different types of 
quality : one type was directly related to their class task, the other was not so relat· 
ed. 'J'o perform their primary role task well, the members of the ruling class had to 
be physically strong, inteUigent in the planning and conducting of wars, brave in 
battle, and protective of their dependents. But these role-related excellences were 
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of being an agathos. Achilles remains an 
agathos even though he sulks in his tent and refuses to fight when he should have 
joined in the fight against the Trojans. Paris rema'ins an agathos despite his inde(ens· 
ible behavior in steaJing Helen, which brings the disastrous war to Troy, and des­
pite his fail ure to join his brothers in the fight. Penelope's suitors behave disgrace· 
fully but they remain agathoi nevertheless. Conversely, only those with noble stat­
us can be agathoi. Even those who once had it but somehow lost it, e.g., by being 
captured and turned into slaves or by losing their wealth, cannot remain agathoi 
however admirable their other excellences. Mem'bers of the lower classes cannot be 
good men, agathoi; they cannot have the virtues. They can on�y be good servants, 
shepherds, and so on. The Homeric conception of the virtues thus is not strictly 
meritarian !but aristocratic, class-bound. What counts are not simply the acquired 
role-specific skills, motives, and behavioral dispositions on account of which men 
succeed in performing their role function, but all those characteristics, among them 
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which hE' is E'nviE'd. nattered. honored. feared. admirE>d. and dE'fn'rE'd to. ThE'se in· 
cludE' but are not limited to t hosE' attit udt>!' which can tw acqui�d and emulatt>d if 
one makl's the eff on. and whose possession is necessary and sufndPnt for success in 
Lhe role tasks. 
The primary question in th�· HomE'ric morality was: Is hE' a good man'? ThP 
other major question of ethics. What exactly ought one to do'? was not in the fort>· 
front of the GrE>eks' mind. Insofar as they ao;ked that question at all. it  was formu· 
lated in terms of what it was honorable or contemptible rather than ri1?ht or wrong 
to do. and the answer was derhed from the answer to the question they regarded as 
primary. The thing one ought to do. the honorable thing, was whatt>n•r an a)!a(hos 
would typica lly do. To answer that question .  onE' would ask onPsPlf what sonH' 
paragon of Homeric \'irtue. such as OdyssPus, would have do1w in the rir<'umstanees. 
The Homerie Grt>Pks felt no nt>Pd to justify callinf! any of thPst> particular <'hatrac­
teristics virtues. It must ha-.;·e seemE'd lo them self-evidPnt that Odysseus was � 
excellence worthy of admiration and emulation. For if ont> was likP him, one was 
in fact admired and honored b�· e\'er�·one that mattered . and what furtht'T justifica­
tion for calling him \'irtuous could one demand? 'They never thought of raisin!! the 
question whether one r<'ally ought to do what was gem•rally admired and c•mulated 
in their socierty, whether it was truly worthy of admiration and emulation. To 1.atN 
Greeks this was much less obvious. 
My second brief sketch is of another and immensl'ly in0u<'ntial GrE>ek \'irt ues­
ethics, namely. that found i n  Plato's Republic. For our purposes. the most impor­
tant novelty in this theory is the important role assignt>d to R(•ason. both in the 
structure of the individual human mind and in the organization o f  the ideal soei,ely. 
According to Plato, as will be remembered . the human mind has three diffenint 
aspects or parts, the desiring part which contains the appetites, the spirited part 
which contains some of the emotions. and the reasoning part which contains the 
most important mental power, the Reason. In different persons. diff£>rent parlc;. ar£> 
dominant. If one's desiring part is dominant, one will want to lead a li ft> in which 
much time and e ffort is devo ted to gaining those positiv£> and n<'gativ<' pa�·offs 
which result !from feeding the appetites. If one's spirited part is strong, one will not 
be overly concerned to satisfy the desires, but rather to advance the self, one's 
safety, fortune, achievements, reputation, and honor. If one's reasoning part is 
strong, one's primary concern will be with knowl1edge, judgement, and calculation. 
One will want to stand back from the appetites and emotions as they arisE> in one 
and consider not so much how they might be best satisfied and catered to, but rath­
er whether a111 d to what extent they should be satisfied or whether perhaps they 
should be modified or altogether extirpated if possiblP. Such judgements by the 
reason are made on the basis of what must be done in order to make one's life as a 
whole as good as possible. Reason thus has two importantly di fferen t functions: 
a cognitive one--to judge what is the best thing to do from the point of vit>w of a 
truly good life-·and a practical or executive one--to conform on£>'s behavior to tht' 
judgements o f  one's Reason. 
On the basis o f  this theory of the human mind, Plato advances the claim that 
a truly good life is possi ble for anyone only if the Reason is in control both in the 
person's own psyche and in the social order in which he lives. For the social order 
this means, in the first place, that Plato has to split up the Homeric ruling class into 
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a class or real rulers or guardians and a second subordinate class of ass1stanlS or 
au"ili3ries. HQwever, class membership i� not by birth but by natural endowment. 
It is the guardians' difficult wk to detect such endowment as early as possibl e and 
to make cla�, assignment on that basis. The guardians are of course chosen by the 
strength of their Reason, the auxiliaries by the strength of their Spirit. The role of 
the guardians is to formulate the general directives or laws in accordance with 
which the members or the society are to live. The role of the auxiliaries is to car y 
out and enforce these directives against all those who will not obey them of their 
own free will. Plato thus introduces a real state. The directives of the guardians are 
not to be merely advisory but backed by force. 
To the third class are assigned all those in whom the reasoning and spirited 
parts are comparatively weak and in whom the appetites would dominate if they 
had not by education come to see the need for control by Reason. Plato assumes 
that in many or those in whom the reasoning and the spirited parts are weak, these 
parts are nevertheless sufficiently strong for them to recognize the need for guid­
ance by Reason, though not of course their own Reason, and for control of the 
appetites by Spirit, if not entirely their own spirit, at least their own when aided by 
that or the auxiliaries. 
Plato thus goes along with the Homeric division of society into classes with 
different functions. But apart from subordinating the warrior class to that of the 
intellectuals, he does so on the basis of native talent and taste, not of birth. What 
Is more, he significantly enlarges what might be called the horizon of moral eligi­
bility. His theory makes members of all classes capable of excellence or virtue. No 
one is so lowly or humble as not to deserve recognition or appreciation or approval 
for playing his part well. No matter what a person's native talents or tastes may be, 
his in terests and concerns are to be taken into account in the design of the social 
order. And he is to be takien into account, in the sense of being assigned a part 
which his abilities enable him to play well, a part which, when played well, will 
make his life worthwhile for him and useful to others, and so deserving of recogni­
tion, approval, and, as we should now say, respect. 
On Plato's view, then, a society approaches the ideal or falls short of it, the 
greater the extent of its virtues. It is the more just, the more it succeeds in achiev­
ing willing acceptance of the proper hierarchical arrangement of the three social 
functions. It is wise to the extent that the guardian is wise, courageous to the ex· 
tent that its auxiliaries are courageous, and temperate to the extent that all its 
classes are in harmony, each class satisfied to play the role assigned to it and to see 
others play theirs. 
Unlike the Homeric Greeks, who uncritically accepted their social order and 
merely ranked members of the ruling class on the basis of how well they performed 
their function, Plato sets up criteria for ranking societies and so provides a basis of 
criticizing existing social orders if they fall significantly short of the ideal. 
How radical a change in the conception of virtue this is, is best seen by look­
ing briefly at the virtues of individuals. The four cardinal virtues, wisdom, courage, 
temperance (or moderation), and justice, which Plato takes over from the then 
current conventional morality, are transformed by his theory. They are no longer, 
as the Home·ric Greeks saw them, patterns of motivation, attitudes, and behavior 
which anyone can immediately and independently see to be admirable, enviable, 
62 7
Baier: Virtue Ethics
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1982
Kurt Baier 
and worthy of emulation. According to Plato. such a packagt> of moti\·ation. atti· 
tudes and beha\'ior is a \'irtue and admirable etc., onlv in so far as 1t leads its ownfr 
to beha\'e in such a way as to produce a good life for himself and others. It is thus 
perfectly possible that a whole society should admire people for having the wrong 
patterns of moli\'es. altitudes and beha\'ior. For what makes such a motin•-cum· 
attitude-cum-beha\'ior a Platonic \'irtue is a \'ery complex question. the answer de­
pending al least in part on the consequences of ha\'iing 11 .i What 1s more. 1t imoln•s 
not merely the consequences for oneself of haring it onPself. but also the conse­
quences for others. in the same class or in othE'r classE's. of a whole class ha\'ing it. 
And it invol\·E's comparing these consequences for alternati\'l' social orders. The epis· 
temologically basic question is thus no longer simply what sort of person e\'f.'ry­
body should be--because for one thing not everybody should be the same sort of 
person-- but rather, how society should be organize d, what walks of life should be 
available in i t .  and how people should be assigned to them. and all this in order 
that everyone may have the best chance of lE'ading a life that is fulfillinJ? and worth­
while, given his particular type of psychological endowments. In Plato's s�·stem the 
virtues are no tonger conceived of as definite specific molives-cum-atlitudes-curn­
behavior, such as chastity or thrift. but rather as those moti\·es-cum-atlitudes-cum­
behavior that incline one to do whatevt-r makes lif<' worthwhile for on<'self and 
others, and that may vary a great deal from case to case, chastit� or thrift in one 
situation, indulgence or largesse in another. 
We have already noted another feature of the Platonic ethics not present in 
the Homeric one, namely, that the Platonic social order constitutes a true stale. 
The guidelines worked out by the guardians are not merely advisory. but genuinely 
obligatory: it is not solely each individual's business to decide whether or not to 
fol low them, as if they were the directives of a recipe or an Almanac. The guardians 
do not have merely expert or charismatic, but genuinely ex officio authority: not 
merely authority which guides, but authority which binds. Homeric society had no 
law and no state, for it had no enforcers. The only public official was the herald. 
The Homeric basileus was not a real king, but more like a medieval baron. Th<' 
mightiest baron was usually chosen to lead in war, but when the campaign was over, 
he ceased to be an overlord. The Platonic guardians by contrast can always have 
their guidelines carried out and enforced by the permanent auxiliaries. As a conse­
quence, the virtues are not simply character traits on account of which their poss­
essors come to be admired, envied, and emulated. Nor is it sufficient that those, 
though only those, people should be virtuous who happen to want to be admired, 
emulated, and envied, even if most of them want to. On the Platonic view, the vir· 
tues are qualities which members of the society are required to have. People who 
lack them are not simply inferior like those lacking a special skill, such as harp 
playing or fencing. Rather they are guilty of a special sort of failing, something on 
account of which they may be disapproved of or condemned, perhaps even punish­
ed, and that is something quite different from merely not being admirable, enviable, 
or worthy of emulation. It is also different from being looked down upon or des· 
pised. It is often thought that features of this kind can be explained only by a 
different type of ethics, namely, law or command ethics, which stresses the so­
called deontic concepts such as duty and obligation, ought and must, rather than 
the excellences and virtues. 
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This brin� me LO my third system: The ethi<"i of Christ1 anit�. This. though 
outwardly a virtue ethics, aJso contains strong elf>menLI\ of a law or command t'thics. 
in which deontic concepts play a large role. Here r am en·n morE- con!.ciou. than in 
the first two �ketches or my over-c;implifkauons and the near·arbinannes<; of what 
I select and what I leave out. 
Plato's ethics, you re<.".all, suggests the possi bility and rai'>E-c; the horw that. a<> 
a sociaJ order approaches the Platonic ideal, all men living under that order can find 
a waJk of life which gives scope to their talents and caters to their taste·!'" Plato's 
own sensibilities and sympathies, Wf> noted, did not, however. extend very far tow· 
ards the third or producer class of his ideal societ y. �o method of production was 
so awful (not even the terrible silver mines or the chain.gang labor on some farms ). 
or so degradi ng (as is most work done by slaves). that in his \'iew i t  should be out­
lawed in the ideal society. Plato did not notice, or did not care about, the hopeless­
ness and the misery of men condemned to such debilitating, body-and-soul·destroy· 
ing existences. His main concern was to ensure that men with the mentality of 
producers should not aspire to and try to enter on careers in the auxiliary or guard· 
ian class. Christianity, by contrast, was most receptive and sympathetic to the 
plight and desperation of the weary and heavy laden. It preached a message of 
equality in the sight of God, of universal brotherhood and lo\•e, and of human 
worth and worthiness of concern. The life of Christ raised hopes of redemption and 
salvation tor those who fared badly in this world, which is generally represented by 
Christian ethics as a vaJe of tears. Of course, Christianity does not hold out hopes 
or a change !or the better in this world, by way of social change or revolution. 
Christianity sets its sights very high, and by this exalted standard condemns this 
world and all its rewards as quite incapable of providing a truly worthwhile or 
fulfilling lite tor anybody, however well placed he may be in any social order. 
Man's true and complete fulfillment can come on'ly in the herealfter. Nevertheless, 
even that otherworldly hope can give one strength to endure the blows of this 
earthly existence and engender willingness to accept one's fate or one's social situa­
tion. In this way, Christianity provides a dual consolation for those who are under­
privileged. It tells them in the first place that even the best on earth is really not 
worth having and so no one's position is really enviable. And it tells them, in the 
second place, that what awaits them in the afterlife, provided they are virtuous and 
obey the commandments down here, is more than an adequate compensation for 
renouncing the paltry goods this life has to offer. 
It is against this background of general teaching that we must understand the 
Christian ethics of virtue. We should note, however, that that ethics is deeply ambig­
uous, not to say divided, on the question of whether the virtues are epistemological­
ly basic as we saw they were in Homeric ethics. If one were to sum up the Christfan 
message in one slogan, it would have to be, 'Love'. Love God and love your neigh­
bor. On the face of lt this looks like a mental attitude or behavior pattern, a rival of 
the ancient Greek cardinal virtues. But since the New Testament has to be continu­
ous with the Old, which contains a law or command ethics, this raises many prob­
lems. In particular, we must inquire into the relation between love and the other 
virtues, and Into the relation between having the Christian virtues and doing what is 
required by the moral law or the Ten Commandments. 
Accordtng to St. Augustine, it certainly looks as though the primary question 
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is. What sort of a person Lo be. For his ('('ntral moral ad,·ice is summed up in his 
famous slogan 'Lore God and then do what you like!'. Thus the question of what a 
person ought to do can be answered onl� by referen� to lhe question of what he 
should be like. But the answer is not quice that imple and straightforward, for t.he 
\Utues are also lo be construed as those beha\1oral dispositions following which 
will realize one ·s end. St. Augustine distingui hes bt>t \\ een man's natural and his 
supernatural ends. The latter is to atlain sah·ation and the former is to lt'ad as good 
a life as is compatible with attaining the supernaLural end. To attain one's super­
natural end, one must rulurate the so-called theological ,·irtues. faith. hope. and 
charity (or lo,e). So the knowledge that these are virtues is not direct, but dt>pends 
on the knowledge of our supernatural end. All the same, up to this point it seemed 
that at least we can know what the virtues are without knowing first what we ought 
to do. Love seems primary. law secondary. But even this is not crystal clear. for SL 
Augustine manages so lo define 'love' that it includes the four cardinal virtues of 
the Greeks, prudence, temperance, courage, and justice, and that ill all depends on 
whether these virtues can be defined independently of how one ought to acl. But 
we need not pursue this further. 
Aquinas complicates the Augustian picture by superimposing a systematic 
natural law theory of morality. thus making the question of what Lo do co-equal 
with that of what to be, if not indeed prior lo it. Aquinas holds that the world is a 
sort of cosmic legaJ order, the Law governing it, the Eternal Law, having been im­
posed on the world by God. Mankind participates in this order in two unique ways. 
In lhe first place, man, by means of the light of reason implanted by God in his 
heart, knows that segment or the Eternal Law, called Natural Law, which governs 
the part of the universe occupied by man. This insight into the relevant part or 
God's plan enables man to guide his decisions and choices so as lo attain his natural 
and supernaturaJ ends. In the second place, man has free will, and so may decide, as 
he sees fit, to obey or not to obey the Natural Law. Our knowledge of the virtues 
cannot thus be prior to and independent of our knowledge or what to do. For we 
know the latter by our reason and independently of our knowledge of the virtues, 
but what the virtues are cannot itself be independent of what the law tells us to do. 
Indeed, it would seem that the law is primary, for it not merely tells us how we 
could attain our ends if we wanted to attain them, but commands us-·categorically, 
as Kant later puts it-·to do as the law spells out. Thus, it seems either that Law and 
Love are co-equal or that law is primary. 
There is a third way of construing the relation between law and love, which 
has been taken by more recent thinkers. The idea is that the New Testament mess­
age of love in an important sense completes the Old Testament law morality of 
the Ten Commandments. The speciaJ sense of 'completion' is often explained by 
the New Testament parable of "Walking the Second Mile". Law lays down the 
minimum which is moraJly wanted of us-walking the first mile. Love asks us to do 
more than that minimum-waJking the second mile. The law asks us to do our duty, 
love asks us to do more than it. On this view, virtue begins where duty ends; where 
what we do becomes morally supererogatory and meritorious, deserving or appreci· 
ation and gratitude, something that could not have been asked of us as our duty, or 
someone else's due or right. On this view, law and love are not mutually indepen­
dent nor is one primary. They presuppose a common dimension: what is moraJly 
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wanted, and they are mutually complemenLary. between them filling the presuppos· 
ed common dimension. 
So rar, I have sketched three instances of genuin(' types of ,·irtue ethics and 
emphasiit-d certain differences between them. 
The first difference is this. Homeric ethics is a virtu£- ethics in the fullest sense. 
The idea of virtue is epistemologically basic. In order to know what a virtue is, no 
other ethical question has to be answered first: no answer to any other ethical ques­
tion has any bearing on this one: and all the other important ethical questions have 
Lo be answered by reference Lo it. This is not true of the later forms of virtue ethics. 
In fact, in them questions of what to do become co-equal with questions of what 
to be or even prior to them. 
The second difference is that while Homeric ethics conceives of virtues as 
simply those motives, behavior patterns, and attitudes on account of which one is 
admired, envied, and deferred to, the later theories conceive of virtues as motives, 
behavior, and attitudes which people ough t to have. whether or not they wish to be 
admired, envied, or deferred to. But these later theories have no good explanation 
of why one ought to have them. 
The third di fference is that the two later versions of virtue ethics greatly ex­
pand the range of beings whose concerns are taken into account in determining 
what to be and do and that they show much greater awareness of the need to justi­
fy the moral principles they advocate, to those governed by them, in terms of the 
way being governed by them would affect them. And they differ importantly in 
respect of what effects are to count. 
With these points in mind, we can now turn to modem theories of ethics and 
modern conceptions of virtue. As we have seen, the earliest virtue ethics regarded 
as central the question of what sort of person to be, and answered by the question 
of what to do by reference to what the virtuous person would do. By contrast, 
modern ethics regard as epistemologically primary the question of what to do, and 
answers tlhe question of what sort of person to be--insofar as that question is prop· 
erly ethical rather than aesthetic or whatever--by reference to the kind of psycho· 
logical and character makeup, possession of which would bring it about that one 
does the right thing simply by acting "in character". One might perhaps allow, 
with Kant, that in certain very special circumstances the requirements of morality 
might require one to act out of character. Thus a generous man who has fallen on 
hard times may have to be tight-fisted towards his acquaintances in order to secure 
essentials for his family. But that sort of thing should happen relatively infrequent· 
ly in a normal life: for one's moral education and one's moral self-improvement 
would tend to mould one's character so that in the normal course of life one could 
count on doing the right thing simply by acting in character. 
In contemporary ethics, that first and central question of what to do is app· 
roached against a web of beliefs, attitudes and institutions which are significantly 
different from those of the Greeks and early, or even medieval, Christians. 
Perhaps the most important novelty is the modern unwillingness, no doubt 
due to the success of science, to accept authoritative pronouncements about the 
unseen and the beyond. Today, even many devout Christians regard talk about an 
afterlife as metaphorical. Li ving so as to achieve salvation and avoid damnation is 
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Thus. insofar as ethics is at all related to the good life. it is related to the good life 
in this world. not some other world. 
A second modem belief is that there is no such thing as Lhe absolutely best 
life--that no single pattern "ill suit e\"erybody. that pt>ople often find that they 
have made a mistake in their first choice. that pt>ople's tastes can change along the 
way, and that no one can tell reliably what life style a given pt>rson will find fumfill­
ing. Since it is now widely believed that this life on earth may be the only ont- Wt' 
get. the choice of life patte rn and life style is one of the most important decisions 
a person has to make. It is taken as virtually axiomatic that. therefore. every nor­
mal adult should. as far as possible. be free to make that choice himself. Even 
though a given individual may not be the best judge himself. it is nevertheless held 
that no one else should ha\1e the right of. and the responsibility for. making that 
decision for him. 
This hi,ghlights the further question of what determines how close a person 
will come to what he regards as the optimal life for himself. There appear to be five 
crucial factors: (i) genetic endowment both as regards one's talents. one's tastt's. 
and one's dis.positions--what Rawls has felicitously called "the lottery of natun>": 
(ii) one's personal good or bad luck; (iii) what one can do oneself to bring 01w's tiff' 
closer to what one conceives as optimaJ: (iv) what other people can do to interfert> 
with one's plans or to help one carry them out: and lastly (v) what society can do. 
especially by assigning one's social starting place. 
So far scientists have been able to do very little--and perhaps that is fortun· 
ate--abou t  the lottery of nature. Again, we cannot of course hope altogether to 
eliminate bad luck. So, there remains only what we can do ourselves, what other 
individuals can do, and what society can do. With the growth of the power of soc­
iety, that is, the government, especially during the last 100 years, there has come 
an increasing concern with making the social factor as favorable as possible for 
each individuaJ. That has taken the form of various kinds of welfare schemes lo 
lessen the impact of the blows of fortune, and of more radical social reforms aimed 
at improving some of the walks of life from among which members may choose or 
into which they may be shunted more or less forcibly by social mechanisms. 
Against these convictions, modern moral philosophy has tried to build theo­
ries with the aid of which everyone can answer moral questions and solve moral 
problems. Such theories should of course yield solutions which do not run counter 
to reason, for if they did, a person could always query whether he should be moral, 
that is, whether he should do what these theories tell him to do. Indeed, any answer 
to the central moral question, 'What ought a given person to do?', must be takelll to 
imply that that person has adequate, perhaps compelling, reason to act as the ans­
wer tells him to act. It must not be the case that there is a better reason for him to 
do something else. 
Moral questions, it is commonly believed, are practical ones. Answers lo them 
can be complied with or disregarded. Such moral questions can be asked, answered, 
and complied with or disregarded only by rational beings, beings who can reason at 
least in the sense that they can suitably apply generaJ directives to particular cases, 
thereby answering moral questions and solving moral problems. If Jones wants to 
watch a football game and I know that she told Smith she would take him to a 
certain movie, and if I know that that constituted a promise and know also that 
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promises ought to be kept. then I can condude that Jones ou�hl. other thin�s equal. 
to keep her promise and takP Smith lo that mo\·ie rather than watch the game. 
Such practical reasoning is intended to tnable in dividuals in a great rariety of situa· 
lions to guide themsel\'es in suc:h a way that their lives will be more wo rt hwhile or 
rulfilling than they would be if they followed unreflective incli nation . 
Many or us also beEieve that moral questions are that subdass of practical 
questions, concerning which it is rational for everyone to desire that everyone cor-
. recUy answer them and then conform to his answers. Whether to conform with 
such answen; to such questions is thought to be not solely the agent's own business. 
but also the business of others. Such rational concern varies in strength in import­
ant ways. Where it is rational to complain, disapprove, or condemn a person, when 
he does not comply, and to take it simply for granted when he does comply, 
we think olf that as his duty or obligation, and that he comply as our due or 
!i&h!· If, as in the case of walking the second mile, it is not rational for others 
to complain, when he does not conform, and to approve, commend, or praise him 
when he does, then his doing is said to be something beyond his duty, but still 
something that is morally wanted or welcome: something that he ought to do. 
though he need not. 
Human beings are not, it is plain, born as moral agents. Everybody has to 
learn to become one. We could not learn this if we did not grow up in a society 
which has what is sometimes cfilled the institution of morality. Such a society 
teaches its members the roles to be played in determining what people may in 
reason ask of one another and what such requests by others they may reject. The 
basic role is, of course, that of the moral agent trying to work out what morally 
speaking is wanted of him in the particular situation in which he finds himself. 
To be able to do this he must have learnt the skill of practical reasoning and the 
general directives which formulate what is generally wanted of a moral agent. Be­
ing a moral agent thus presupposes the roles of moral teacher and moral learner. 
But since the general moral directives or precepts which the learner accepts. from 
his teacher are not necessarily sound, he must also learn to play the role of moral 
critic or reformer, the role moral philosophers have paid most attention to. All the 
roles mentioned so far are concerned with answering the question of what, morally 
speaking, one ought to do. But there also are three other roles, those of the moral 
accuser, defender, and judge. They are concerned with ascertaining the quality of 
someone's performance as a moral agent, that is, with his performance of the cog­
nitive task of judging what he ought to do, and the executive task of doing it, in 
short his moral merit--and over time, his virtue. The moral accuser accuses someone, 
himself or another, of having performed these tasks badly, the defender will come 
to his defense, and the judge will pass judgement on him. Of course, unlike a legal 
verdict, such a judgement is never final. 
The moral enterprise is thus conceived as one of rational individual self-direc­
tion by the application to particular situations of general socially regarded directives 
or guidelines, formulated !from the point of view of what it is rational for everyone 
to want that others should contribute towards his being able to lead what he con­
cieves of as his optimal life. Now, perhaps the most important part, of what it is 
rational to want from others is that they should support those changes in the social 
order which must be made if it is to be rational for everyone in it to follow its 
purportedly moral directives willingly. The lower classes in a social order such as 
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follow its authori tative din>cli,·es. The Homeric- social ordn did not t>ven purport 
to be organized in a way whi<'h gave them suC'h �ason. Plato's RepubliC' did J?!!!· 
'.P2.!LtO be so organized. but even Plato had to resort to what he called the Noble 
Lie to make a persuasi\·e case that it really was so organized. Modem societies 
!have followed similar techniques. Tht> theory of the Hidden Hand. of the Two 
Nations. Socia'I Darwinism. Racism. Sexism. and so on. and so on, are forevE>r re· 
newed by the unfairly privileged lo persuade the underpri\'ileged of facts which. 
if true, would constitute a good c&SE> for them to willingly a�ept tht> discrimina· 
tory social order. 
It is easy to see why under such a conception of morality and of ethical the· 
ory, the virtues should play a relatively unimportant role. For the question of what 
sort of a person to be, though not unimportant, is ne\'ertheless seen as Lheorelirally 
secondary, and the answer as relatively unproblematic, if one knows the answer to 
the question of what to do. Morally speaking, one ought to be tihe sort of pers·on 
who can, and is inclined to, discharge both the cognitive and the executive tasks of 
a moral agent; namely, to judge correctly what one ought to do and to do it. In a 
npidly changing society such as ours, it may be very difficult to specify any set of 
motives and behavioral disposition, such as courage or chastity or truthfulness or 
thrift, which would always be the appropriate motives to have and the right disposi· 
tion to follow. One may in the end be n>duced to saying what Kant said. namely. 
that the only disposition, indeed the only thing, which is unconditionally and so 
always good is the good will, that is, the will to do whatever reason tells one to do, 
and that may well not be on every occasion what the courageous, the chaste, the 
thrifty, or the truthful person, the person with all the virtues would do. One may, 
in other words, be driven to replace the concept of the specific virtues by the con­
cept of virtue, that which is common to and underlies the many virtues··that in 
virtue of which they are virtues, that is, virtuous motives, virtuous dispositions or 
virtuous modes of behavior. But when one has reached this point, one has abandon­
ed a pure virtue ethics--one has defined virtue in terms of what one ought to do, 
namely, what one has the best reason to think is the right thing to do, whatevC'r 
,one is already motivated to do. 
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